

The Rostow Story

The Otepka briefs relate an intriguing story in connection with the Rostow case. According to the briefs, Bobby Kennedy and Dean Rusk approached Otepka in 1960 about Rostow, well aware that earlier efforts to get him named to a highly sensitive national security project had been thwarted by the Eisenhower Administration's strict security standards.



RUSK

Desiring to appoint Rostow to a key position in the State Department, Rusk opened the discussion by asking: "What kind of security problem would be encountered regarding the appointment of Mr. Rostow to the department?"

Otepka replied that he was acquainted with the Rostow file, and that this familiarity dated back to 1955 when the department was giving consideration to hiring Rostow as a key person in a psychological warfare project to be undertaken by the Operations Co-ordinating Board.

"Persons employed by the project were required to have a security clearance under the strict standards prescribed by the United States Intelligence Board," the briefs state. "As a part of his evaluation, Otepka at this time reviewed the State Department file on Mr. Rostow, the CIA file and the results of reviews given to the case by both the CIA and the Department of the Air Force. The Air Force had previously made a security finding adverse to Mr. Rostow.

"As a result of Otepka's findings, Under Secretary of State Herbert Hoover Jr., the chairman of the Operations Co-ordinating Board, decided that Mr. Rostow would not be utilized as an employee or consultant by the State Department in connection with the board's project.

"In other words, Mr. Rostow could not get the necessary clearance under the strict standards applicable to the Operations Co-ordinating Board."

When Rostow was again recommended for State Department employment, Roderic O'Connor, administrator of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, made the determination on the basis of the previous record that "Mr. Rostow was not desirable for employment."

According to Pulitzer Prize-winning reporter Clark Mollenhoff, who unearthed the contents of the brief, when Otepka related the background on Rostow, Rusk remained silent but Bobby "spoke disparagingly of the adverse finding that had been made by the Air Force" and referred to the Air Force as "a bunch of jerks."

When it became clear that Otepka would continue to evaluate the Rostow case in the same manner as it had been evaluated previously, Rostow was hired by the ~~State Department~~ ^{Operations Co-ordinating Board} and can set his own security rules.

After being given this job, Rostow was moved into the State Department for a time as someone who had already been given a clearance.

Angry with Otepka, Kennedy later assigned John F. Reilly, formerly a Justice Department lawyer, to the State Department as deputy assistant secretary of state in charge of administration. Reilly's role in the anti-Otepka cabal is well documented. This cabal at length plotted and engaged in eavesdropping, wiretapping, searches of Otepka's wastebasket and general spying on his activities in an effort to find grounds on which to dismiss him.

• A former professor of international politics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Rostow is a graduate of Yale and served in the Office of Strategic Services in World War II. Identified as the author of a State Department policy paper promoting unilateral disarmament, trading with the Communists and a generally "soft-line" toward Soviet Russia and Communist China, Rostow has come under considerable attack and was even the subject of a special congressional hearing. In recent years he has been identified with a comparatively hard line on Viet Nam. The Otepka brief reportedly does not disclose why Rostow was denied a security clearance by the Eisenhower Administration.

Fourteen Breaches in Security

The sensational Otepka briefs, whose contents have been revealed to only one or two reporters in Washington, outline numerous cases of alleged security violations. Clark Mollenhoff of the Des Moines Register has detailed 14 of the cases which appear below:

1. A foreign service officer who sexually violated his own daughter but was never disciplined, and in fact later was designated a part-time security officer at a post that did not have a full-time security man.

2. A foreign service officer who borrowed money from the State Department Credit Union and forged the endorsement of a fellow employee on his application for the loan. The individual later was given an important assignment in the White House.

3. A foreign service officer who admitted he furnished 18 documents, some of them classified "secret," to Philip Jaffe, the publisher of *Amerasia* magazine and on whom there was a considerable record of Communist activities and affiliation. The officer was permitted to take an honorable retirement with pension.

4. A security division technician who went on drunken rampages at several embassies in foreign countries and whose misconduct was condoned and covered up by Reilly. Reports of the misconduct actually were kept out of the personnel file.

5. A security officer stationed in Athens, Greece, who failed to report a large number of security violations, yet was appointed deputy chief of the Division of Security Evaluations at the State Department.

THE IMPORTANCE OF SECURITY

6. A person nominated by President Kennedy for a high position who publicly assaulted his wife and threw her clothing on the lawn, shrubbery and street. The information was ordered eliminated from the personnel record by a "progressive" security officer who said such details of a public family fight had nothing to do with security or suitability of a high public official.

7. A man dismissed as a security risk by the Mutual Security Agency and characterized as having "a rotten file" who was appointed to a State Department position and given full security clearance.

8. A foreign service officer stationed in Mexico and Caracas, Venezuela, who was guilty of a series of incidents of sexual misconduct, including an affair with the wife of the ambassador of another nation. His conduct was excused by State Department politicians.

9. A security officer who withheld information from his superiors concerning the loss of classified documents by an American ambassador. The officer was not censured and was promoted to be a top lieutenant of Reilly.

10. A security officer stationed in Moscow who permitted himself to be enticed into the apartment of a Russian woman, an agent for the secret police. The secret police used concealed cameras to photograph the American and his nude companion and tried to get him to spy for the Soviet Union. He never was criticized or disciplined.

11. A foreign service officer who admitted to security officers and State Department medical authorities that he had engaged in homosexual acts. The medical officers found him unfit to serve abroad because in their judgment his homosexual tendencies made him a potential security risk. He was sent abroad, however, and was assigned to a critical post behind the Iron Curtain.

12. A foreign service officer who, on his application form and in interviews, concealed the fact that he had been a member of the Young Communist League and the Communist party. He was not disciplined and still is employed in the State Department.

13. A foreign service officer stationed in an eastern European post who admitted homosexual tendencies and other personal misconduct but who was given responsibility for supervising the Marine guard personnel and protecting all safe combinations at the American embassy. His negligence permitted foreign agents to have access to classified reports at the embassy. He was not disciplined and received normal promotions. He still is in the State Department.

14. A foreign service officer, formerly a security officer, who owned two automobiles but was authorized to have only one shipped to a new post at government expense. He had the second automobile concealed in a lift van and represented it on the invoice as a household furnishing. His case was referred to the Department of Justice for prosecution for fraud, but there was no prosecution and he was not disciplined.

The crucial importance of having a first-rate security program has been driven home by the London *Sunday Times*' sensational new disclosures concerning Harold Philby, the head of the Soviet section of the British Secret Intelligence Service who fled to Moscow in 1963.

Philby's achievement in rising to this position while himself being a Soviet agent, says the *Times*, ranks as one of the greatest espionage coups of all time.

Philby later went on to become the linkman between the British service and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, from which position he could give his Soviet spymasters thorough knowledge of the operations of both the major Western intelligence agencies.

Remarked the *Sunday Times* last week: "... there is a classic quality about the earlier achievement. The selection in 1944 of Philby, already a Soviet agent of more than 10 years' standing, as the man to conceive, build and control a new British operation against the Russians, is an event embodying the purest essence of espionage."

In its investigation into the Philby conspiracy, the *Sunday Times* also unearthed a remarkable 1956 U.S. State Department report on British diplomat Donald Maclean, who fled to Moscow in 1951.

The 1956 report, says the *Sunday Times*, "makes it clear that, contrary to repeated British government assertions since 1951, Donald Maclean had access to every crucial Anglo-American policy decision at the height of the Cold War. . . .

"... the U.S. intelligence report reveals that Maclean had knowledge of secret Anglo-American exchanges on the North Atlantic pact, the Korean War and the Japanese peace treaty.

"It also shows, for instance, that Maclean had full knowledge of the critical American determination to 'localize the conflict,' and therefore of its decision not to allow the United Nations forces under Gen. MacArthur to carry the war against the Chinese coast.

"Both MacArthur and his chief of intelligence, Gen. Charles Willoughby, were certain at the time that this information had been passed to the Russians. Just before he died, MacArthur complained that the Chinese not only knew of this policy decision, but 'all our strategic troop movements.'"

The first secretary in the British Embassy in Washington and later head of the American department in the Foreign Office, Maclean also passed on vital information to the Soviet regarding our atomic secrets.

PHILBY, HAROLD

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